Bildung and Young Nietzsche's Critique of Scholarly Education by Vincent Duhamel
1BILDUNG AND YOUNG NIETZSCHE'S CRITIQUE OF SCHOLARLY 
EDUCATION
In  Nietzsche's  earlier  writings,  a  considerable  amount  of  thought  engages  the  tasks  of 
constructing an  educational  ideal  and developing a  critique of  contemporary scholarly institutions, 
along with corresponding ways to think about education. The peculiar form this concern assumes does 
not emerge out of Nietzsche as out of a void: it originates from a well-established tradition in German 
educational thought – a tradition crystallized in the very German concept of Bildung.
In the educational realm,  Bildung points to an ideal of all-around and harmonious individual 
development. However, before it gained this meaning, the notion was already used by Leibniz, Böhme 
and  Paracelsus  as  a  category  of  natural  philosophy.  According  to  this  pre-educational  meaning, 
Bildung referred to the process of development through which a living being achieves the outward form 
proper to the mature individual of the species. As a concept of natural philosophy, Bildung was deeply 
intertwined with an idea of natural teleology which postulated in nature an order revealed through the 
visibly  goal-oriented  striving  of  the  living  being.  Bildung itself  denoted  the  organism's  physical 
development whenever it occurred according to this natural order.
At  the  end  of  the  18th century,  thinkers  like  Herder  and  Wilhelm  von  Humboldt  became 
instrumental in the expansion of the semantical domain covered by the concept of Bildung. The notion 
then ceased to exclusively stand for the physical development of living beings and came to denote the 
intellectual  development  of  human  beings.  At  this  point,  Bildung enters  the  realm  of  education. 
However, as it acquires an educational meaning, the concept retains its original connection to natural, 
healthy and proper development. This enduring association with an idea of nature Rousseau invested 
with ideal value allowed Germans to oppose Bildung to education proper (Erziehung). While Bildung 
systematically  embodies  an  ideal  kind  of  education,  Erziehung is  compatible  with  the  taming  or 
domestication of individual forces prompted by an appeal to social cohesion or submission to the state. 
That is, while Bildung always refers to an education in harmony with individual and human nature, one 
can speak of  Erziehung as an unnatural process bending individual personality to foreign rules and 
codes and eventually leading the individual on a path of corruption – his own. 
Thinking of Bildung, one thinks away this harmful potential of education, an abstraction which 
grants Bildung a certain moral "thickness". Just as a good form of cruelty is morally impossible, so is 
an educationally impotent or harmful  Bildung.  Proper education, that is, education which would be 
Bildung through and through, would focus on the total unfolding, on the one hand, of generic human 
capacities and, on the other, of powers particular to the individual. The original thrust of  Bildung in 
natural philosophy is thus retained in philosophy of education, although in a somewhat altered manner. 
In education as much as in nature, Bildung would indicate the individual's path towards completeness, 
maturity and perfection. An educative process worthy to be christened Bildung would therefore intend 
to make human beings what they ought to be qua human beings and qua individuals. 
Young Nietzsche takes part in the German Bildungstradition as a polemist set out to measure 
the educational practices and institutions of his time to the ideal meaning congealed in this German 
term.  Through  Humboldt's  work  as  head  of  the  Prussian  department  of  education,  Bildung was 
eventually  made  the  official  objective  to  be  pursued  by  the  educational  institutions  of  his  time. 
Nietzsche took grudge at this endorsement because he thought it allowed institutions to profit from the 
powerful rhetoric associated with the concept itself, although they miserably failed at living up to its 
standards. Through this shift in usage which permitted, from this association onward, to use Bildung to 
2denote what actually goes on in Gymnasiums and Universities, Nietzsche thought one was divesting a 
noble ideal of its regulative nature and tainted it with traces of a contemptible reality. Among the many 
nietzschean critiques aiming at  results of this unhappy association,  the most famous is the critique 
historical culture1 (historische Bildung).
In order to grasp how historical culture could represent, for Nietzsche, a degenerate version of 
Bildung, we have to grasp in what respect the English "culture" is just as improper a term of translation 
as would be "education" when one needs to preserve the rich philosophical tradition contained in the 
German. The core of the problem resides in what is generally thought by means of the concept of 
culture when it becomes an attribute of the individual. When one thinks about culture in this sense, one 
thinks about a sum of knowledge gained by the individual through study or social intercourse. Thus, 
culture is rather foreign to the individual in question. One is not one's culture. With Bildung, however, 
the educative process is thought to penetrate to the core of the person educated. Any Bildung should 
always consist in both harmonisation and expression of the forces present in the individual and not in a 
process through which knowledge is merely piled on without bringing a change in the identity of the 
learner. Or, to say it in the words of Wilhelm von Humboldt : 
... if in our language we say Bildung, we mean something both higher and more inward, 
namely the attitude of mind which, from the knowledge and the feeling of the total 
intellectual and moral endeavour, flows harmoniously into sensibility and character.2
In speaking of Bildung, thinkers like Humboldt therefore intended to single out the all-important stuff 
of general education: a deep change occurring within the person educated. The profound effect Bildung 
should  have  on  the  individual's  inner  life  was  to  materialize  in  the  individual's  self-conquest  of 
responsibility,  in  his  acquisition  of  a  sense  of  objectivity,  as  well  as  in  a  complete  form of  self-
realization.  Under  such  circumstances,  one  must  understand  that  a  genuine  man  of  Bildung (ein 
Gebildeter) was ideally to represent some incarnate ideal of humanity. Young Nietzsche's theory and 
critiques of contemporary education clearly find their own basis in Bildung's original association with 
an ideal of realized humanity.
 In Nietzsche’s eyes, german institutions of education, however firmly they may hold to the 
ideal  of  Bildung as  their  proper  aim,  display  in  reality  a  tendency  towards  the  construction  of 
encyclopedic  culture.  This  tendency reaches  its  consummation  in  what  Nietzsche  calls  historische 
Bildung, an educative model which seems to consider that the proper objective of education consists in 
the accumulation of historical content. This, however, clearly contradicts Bildung's original claim, that 
is, to aim exclusively at some revolution in the inner life of the person educated. Bildung is not about 
the individual’s erudition, it is about the individual’s transformation. According to this perspective, the 
actual content learned would be of less importance than the effect this content has on the individual 
who appropriates it. Historische Bildung therefore represents, for Nietzsche, a debasement of the ideal's 
original  claim.  Under  the  influence  this  degraded  model  exerted  on  contemporary  educational 
institutions,  modern  man  was  gradually  transformed  into  a  walking  encyclopedia.  Nietzsche 
condemned this primacy given to the assimilation of historical content as detrimental to the intellectual 
growth of the individual :
Knowledge, consumed for the greater part without hunger for it and even counter to 
one’s needs,  now no longer acts  as an agent for transforming the outside world but 
1 Here, I translate Bildung as culture, which is one of the common english terms of translation (culture, education, 
edification), because historische Bildung has nothing to do with Bildung proper for the young Nietzsche. 
2 Cited in Educating Humanity : Bildung in Postmodernity, Edited by Lars Løvlie, Klaus Peter Mortensen and Sven Erik 
Nordenbo, Blackwell Publising, 2003, Preface, p.VII.
3remains concealed within a chaotic inner world which modern man describes with a 
curious pride as his uniquely characteristic inwardness. It is then said that one possesses 
content and only form is lacking; but such an antithesis is quite improper when applied 
to living things. This precisely is why our modern culture [Bildung] is not a living thing: 
it is incomprehensible without recourse to that antithesis; it is not a real culture at all but 
only a kind of knowledge about culture.3
Nietzsche thought that a tendency towards the development of encyclopedic culture would not only 
leave the real Bildungsprozess – the actual transformation and unfolding of individual identity – in the 
background,  but  might  very  well  arouse  in  the  individual  an  aversion  for  everything  intellectual, 
branded in advance as foreign and uninteresting. Here, we meet Nietzsche's main objection to the rising 
threat of historische Bildung: it forfeits the ideal's original involvement with the inner life of the person 
educated,  and therefore debases  Bildung to the point where it  can be confused with mere cultural 
erudition. 
One should note, however, that historical culture is simply one of Nietzsche's many targets. In 
fact, erudition in general is frequently the main object of Nietzsche's early critiques. As was said earlier, 
Bildung retained its original ties to natural philosophy in the inherited veneration for all things natural 
proper  to  thinkers  like  Herder  and  Humboldt.  Nietzsche's  metaphor  of  modern  human  beings  as 
walking encyclopedias merely gives the first traces of an enduring critique which extends over the 
totality of Nietzsche's productive life, a critique which often equates scholarly education with an anti-
natural kind of education. This association between the scholarly, the unhealthy and the unnatural is 
frequently expressed in Nietzsche's later writings, where the external aspect of the scholar becomes an 
indication of the state of his intellectual life. His rounded shoulders and blunted eyesight are merely the 
outer signs of a form of artificial corruption which infects him to his core and strains his dulled mind. 
One can already find a foretaste of this critique in the second Untimely Meditation: 
Then there appears  the repulsive  spectacle  of  a  blind rage for  collecting,  a  restless 
raking together of everything that has ever existed. Man is encased in the stench of must 
and mould;  through the  antiquarian approach he succeeds in  reducing even a  more 
creative disposition,  a nobler desire,  to an insatiable thirst  for novelty,  or rather  for 
antiquity and for all and everything; often he sinks so low that in the end he is content to 
gobble down any food whatever, even the dust of bibliographical minutiae.4
Here, the necessities of the profession are represented as sources of the corruption of the scholar's taste. 
This  kind  of  critique  readily  sounds  gratuitous.  This  is  why I  propose  we  turn  for  a  moment  to 
Schopenhauer's critique of abstract knowledge, a perspective which made a deep impression on young 
Nietzsche's thought and which might help us invest some justifiable meaning in those offensive lines. 
For Nietzsche's mentor, all original knowledge stems from imaginative perception: knowledge 
articulated  in  concepts  is  of  a  derivative  nature  and  obtains  its  truth  second  hand,  from  that  of 
perception.  From this insight,  Schopenhauer  launches a  powerful  critique of learned culture which 
culminates  in  a  disdain  for  scholarly  thought  rarely  to  be  seen.  When  knowledge  comes  to 
communication through the sole medium of the concept, it is severed from the source through which 
the concept acquires its truth, therefore duplicating itself in the mind of the receiver as pure abstraction. 
This brings Schopenhauer to deem superior the task of communication when it effectively summons 
imaginative thought to assist the concept in reacquiring its truth. Of authors who succeed at bringing 
3 On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life, in Untimely Meditations, Trans. R.J. Hollingdale, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1983, p. 78.
4 On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life, in Untimely Meditations, p. 75.
4back the concept to its perceptive roots in the minds of their readers, Schopenhauer says that they think 
in the presence of perception. Books, however, are seldom worth the paper they are printed on for the 
notorious pessimist, and therefore the process of learning through books usually becomes a process 
through  which  abstract,  unperceptive  knowledge  is  accumulated  in  the  mind  of  the  reader.  The 
knowledge thus accumulated always deals with the universal: a fact which becomes a paradox when 
one goes in search of the universal in the world and finds nothing but the particular.
… for the man who studies to gain insight, books and studies are merely rungs of the 
ladder on which he climbs to the summit of knowledge. As soon as a rung has raised 
him one step, he leaves it behind. On the other hand, the many who study in order to fill 
their memory do not use the rungs of the ladder for climbing, but take them off and load 
themselves with them to take away, rejoicing at the increasing weight of the burden. 
They remain below forever, because they bear what should have borne them.5 
Schopenhauer does recognize some uses to abstract knowledge – in some situations, he grants, it is 
more appropriate than knowledge from perception. However, the core of the problem emerges when, 
through exclusive intercourse with abstract knowledge about the universal, the scholar loses the power 
of imaginative thinking which is the hallmark of superlative thought. The scholarly mind thus comes to 
relate to the book as Pavlov's dog does to the bell: the main difference being that the dog does not 
salivate about the bell. If great thinkers reflect in the presence of perception, then it can be said of the 
scholar that he thinks only in the presence of the book – and about the book. 
Therefore, while the correct apprehension of the world of perception has impressed the 
stamp of insight and wisdom on the brow of many an unlearned man, the face of many a 
scholar bears no other traces of his many studies than those of exhaustion and weariness 
through excessive and forced straining of the memory for the unnatural accumulation of 
dead concepts. Such a man frequently looks so simple, silly and sheepish, that it must be 
supposed that the excessive strain of the indirect faculty of knowledge, applied to the 
abstract, produces a direct weakening of the immediate knowledge of perception and that 
the natural and correct view is dazzled more and more by the light of books.6
The fundamental flaw Schopenhauer sees in scholarly education seems to be that, through the exclusive 
devotion to the kind of learning one gathers from books, a more fundamental power in the subject dries 
up  and  perishes.  Exclusive  devotion  to  abstract  knowledge  thus  becomes,  for  Schopenhauer,  self-
defeating.  In  renouncing imaginative thinking,  one renounces  the only means able  to  create  novel 
abstract knowledge, since only from perception does knowledge come, according to Schopenhauer. 
Scholarly education therefore condemns the individual to perpetually chew on the same facts and the 
same thoughts, without progress and without invention.
Young  Nietzsche  visibly  feeds  on  some  of  Schopenhauer’s  bitter  remarks  about  scholarly 
education: in fact, Nietzsche seems to turn his mentor’s original attacks against the primacy of abstract 
knowledge into attacks against the paradigmaticity of the scholar as an ideal of human realization. This 
ad hominem turn to the polemic stems from a tacit identification between the man of great erudition 
(Gelehrter) and the man of Bildung (Gebildeter) Nietzsche sees expressed in the educative system of 
his time. 
Our whole modern world is caught in the net of Alexandrian culture [Cultur], and the 
5 The World as Will and Representation, Trans. E. F. J. Payne, Dover, New York, volume II, p. 80.
6 The World as Will and Representation, Trans. E. F. J. Payne, Dover, New York, volume II, p. 78.
5highest  ideal  it  knows  is  theoretical  man,  equipped  with  the  highest  powers  of 
understanding and working in the service of science, whose archetype and progenitor is 
Socrates. The original aim of all our means of education is to achieve this ideal; every 
other form of existence has to fight its way up alongside it, as something permitted but 
not intended. It is almost terrifying to think that for a long time the man of culture [der 
Gebildete] was to be found here in the guise of the man of learning [des Gelehrten].7
Although  German  Gymnasiums,  Universities  and  Academies  all  claim to  aim at  Bildung as  their 
ultimate end, Nietzsche thinks their outward activities reveal a totally different objective : as a whole, 
the  contemporary  educative  process  is  oriented  towards  the  production  of  the  scholar.  In  the 
Gymnasium of Nietzsche’s Germany, this intention to make scholars of men is made explicit, on the 
one hand in the part played by the historical sciences in the education of the youth, and on the other, in  
the  generally theoretical  nature  of  the  instruction.  However,  an  institution  which claims to  aim at 
Bildung and makes scholars out of men can be doing one of two things for Nietzsche: either it claims to 
endorse  standards  it  does  not  attempt  to  meet  and is  therefore  engaged in  a  remarkable  piece  of 
educational hypocrisy,  or it  purports to present the type of the scholar as a paradigmatical type of 
realized  humanity.  Nietzsche  himself  does  not  seem  to  know  how  one  should  interpret  this 
inconsistency, and he therefore sets out to both condemn the educational institutions of his time as 
hypocritical and to critique the type of the scholar as an alleged ideal of human development and total 
self-realization. The ad hominem flavour of Nietzsche’s critiques of scholarly education can therefore 
be justified by appealing to the fact that one needs to deal with types of persons here. If Bildung stands 
for an education aiming at  the production  of mature and complete individuality,  then to reveal the 
process actually taking place as inauthentic Bildung is to engage in a critique of the kind of individual 
this  process  does,  in  fact,  produce.  In  other  words,  if  some  kind  of  education  produces  sickly, 
unidimensional  and unhappy human  beings,  then  it  can  be  debunked  as  an  inappropriate  type  of 
education.
We already have access to blocks of the argument Nietzsche aims at the scholar: the extensive 
culture of the scholar is not synonymous with the inner transformation of sensibility and character 
which should necessarily attend real Bildung. Encyclopedic culture as such can leave the inner life of 
the individual unaffected, as does the rote learning of a medicine student preparing for tomorrow’s 
exam. To this distinction between culture and  Bildung, we may add Nietzsche's endorsement of the 
schopenhauerian perspective, according to which a too great accumulation of abstract knowledge may 
have a detrimental effect on the vitality of the individual's intellectual life. Nietzsche, however, adds to 
the schopenhauerian argument a concern for the increasing one-sidedness of scholarly erudition. In the 
past, being learned may have legitimately represented an ideal of human achievement, especially when 
the sum of knowledge was much smaller. This fact allowed the existence of polymaths like Leonardo 
Da Vinci or Leibniz.  However,  as the sum of human knowledge grows exponentially,  so does the 
division between the various branches tending to this knowledge. The scholarly man therefore needs to 
turn, in the modern world, towards a single corner in the colossal treasury of human knowledge and 
focus exclusively on his own speciality in order to be of use :
If, in his specialization, he stands over the Vulgus, he nevertheless belongs to it in every 
other respect, that is, in all things important. Such a scholar resembles the shop worker 
who devotes his life to making some kind of screw or handle designed for a precise tool 
or machine, a task at which he comes to excel. […] For centuries one took as self-
evident that, thinking of the cultivated man [Gebildeten], one thought of the scholar and 
7  Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings, Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 86.
6the scholar only; contemporary experience, however, does not entitle us to such a naive 
identification.  The exploitation of a man in the name of science is  now a principle 
accepted everywhere: who still asks what value has a science which uses its servants as 
would a vampire?8
Through his instrumentalization by science, the scholar does not differ fundamentally from the hyper-
specialized  worker  anymore.  One  can  indeed  wonder  how  exactly  the  meticulous  work  of  the 
philologist  – engaged in numbering the occurrences of the epithet  antitheos in Homer's Odyssey – 
would be involved in the total cultivation of his own being if the same cannot be said of the farmer  
tending to his field. In a world in which division of work rules over scientific disciplines, science’s  
claim to promote total cultivation of the human soul loses much of its credibility.  As a specialized 
instrument of science, the scholar is therefore subjected to a fate similar to that of the working man: he 
is condemned to remain forever chained to his speciality in the midst of the gigantic manufacture of 
science. If the scholar indeed represents an ideal of human realization, then modern man appears to be 
thoroughly doomed by scientific and technological progress to become increasingly unidimensional. 
Now, the gradual subdivision of all scientific knowledge may very well be essential to the smooth 
gyration of the whole scientific mechanism, but Nietzsche thinks this inescapable fact must not blind us 
to  this  other  fact:  that  it  is  through  the  progressive  instrumentalization  of  human beings  that  this 
smoothness is acquired. 
This might all seem beside the point, since education itself is usually thought to cover only a 
small part of human existence – childhood and pre-professional life – and science proper only makes 
demands on human beings  who are already engaged in science  as their  professional  life.  In other 
words, the unidimensional reality of modern scientific research only makes claims on individuals who 
have already chosen this path and who may have already benefited from an all-around education earlier 
in their lives. General education is the necessary background to any scholar's academic specialization. 
This, however, is where the nietzschean perspective diverges from our ordinary ways to think about 
education. To think of education as a necessary process in the development of individual human beings 
is not only to think of education as a gateway to the modern realm of labor, but also to think of it as a  
process essential to the development of the individual qua individual, of the human being qua human 
being. Nietzsche's account capitalizes on this fundamental role of education with regards to intellectual 
growth  and  on  Bildung's  original  vocation,  that  is,  complete  cultivation  of  the  human  soul.  This 
vocation may lead the contemporary eye to simply brand the concept of Bildung as an unrealistic ideal 
whenever  it  ventures  beyond  elementary  school  and  high  school  education  into  collegial  and 
professional life. According to such a point of view, education is indeed necessary to the harmonious 
development of individuals and human beings, but only to a point: until one crosses the threshold of 
physical and intellectual maturity. Education geared towards the securing of a profession needs not be 
decried so long as this process of specialization only begins once physical and intellectual maturity are 
reached through some form of general education. 
8 This is my translation. "Wird er nun schon in seinem Fach über dem Vulgus stehen, in allen Übrigen gehört er doch zu 
ihm, d.h. in allen Hauptsachen. So ein exclusiver Fach gelehrter ist dans dem Fabrikarbeiter ähnlich, der, sein Leben 
lang, nicht anderes macht als eine bestimmte Schraube oder Handhabe, zu einem bestimmten Werkzeug oder zu einer 
Maschine, worin er dann freilich eine unglaublich Virtuosität erlangt. […] Es sind Jahrhunderte vergangen, in denen es 
sich von selbst verstand, daß man unter einem Gebildeten den Gelehrten und nur den Gelehrten begriff; von den 
Erfahrungen unserer Zeit aus würde man sich schwerlich zu einer so naive Gleichstellung veranlaßt fühlen. Denn jetzt 
ist die Ausbeutung eines Menschen zu Gunsten den Wissenschaften die ohne Anstand überall angenommene 
Voraussetzung: wer fragt sich doch, was eine Wissenschaft werth sein mag, die so vampyrartig ihre Geschöpfe 
verbraucht?" Über die Zukunft unserer Bildungs-Anstalten, Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe, Bd.1, De 
Gruyter, 1999, p.669-670
7Nietzsche restlessly resisted this pull exerted by modern reality on the ideal meaning congealed 
in  the  concept  of  Bildung.  Education  was,  for  him,  truly  what  was  originally  intended  in  the 
Bildungsideal: the means through which the individual and humanity itself should raise beyond their 
existing forms :  a  qualitative jump beyond the  human and the actual.  The quest  for  Bildung thus 
represents the first manifestation of a quest for a higher, nobler and more perfect humanity which will  
receive, in works such as  Thus Spoke Zarathustra, its definitive form. Although Nietzsche's critique 
engages – with the concept of Bildung – the scholar on an explictly educative ground, it clearly extends 
beyond what we usually consider educative grounds. One needs to insist, however, on the fact that, in 
his  assault  against  the man of erudition,  Nietzsche does not commit  a crime unprecedented in the 
philosophical  tradition.  Heraclitus'  famous principle  "Great  learning does  not  teach understanding" 
introduced a distinction in educational thought between a form of learning which, although extensive, 
is merely accessory and superficial and another, through which a fundamental change occurs in the 
individual. The idea of Bildung was constituted – in all its incarnations – through this opposition to a 
form of education thought to be at best a simple tool for the individual, and at worst, a corruption of his 
inner being.
